Outline summary In appendix A we present the model with time period of length ∆. In appendix B and C we provide additional details of the BGP and transition dynamics, including the proofs of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. In appendix D we present the log-linearized system of equations that we use to solve for a first order approximation to the transition dynamics to a new BGP. In appendix E, we describe how we calibrate the parameters of the model using observations of aggregates and firm dynamics on a BGP. In appendix F we describe the experiments and present the tables with the quantitative results.
A Model with time period of length ∆
We present the model when the time period in calendar time is of length ∆. We have two reasons to consider a flexible period length. First, the stability properties of the balanced growth path of the model solved in discrete time depend upon the length of a time period. Second, the impact on the incentives of incumbent firms to invest in improving their own products coming from variation in the extent of business stealing in the transition to a BGP due to variation in the rate of entry also depends on the length of a time period. In our computations, we set the time period to one month.
The Final Consumption Good
where (1 − exp(−∆d k ))/∆ represents the depreciation rate per unit time of physical capital. The preferences of the representative agent are given by
with β < 1 and γ > 0. Population grows exogenously at rates g Lt with L t+1 = exp(∆g Lt )L t .
The consumption good Aggregate output is given by the CES aggregator
where ρ > 1, M t (z) is the measure of intermediate goods with frontier technology indexed by z at time t and the production of each intermediate input with productivity index z is given by:
With common markups and competitive factor markets, aggregate output can be written in equilibrium as
where total labor hours employed in production satisfy l pt L t = ∑ z l t (z)M t (z) , the constraint on physical capital requires K t = ∑ z k t (z)M t (z), and aggregate productivity Z t is given by
M t = ∑ z M t (z) is the total measure of products available, and Z ρ−1 t /M t is the average productivity index of existing intermediate goods (specifically, the average of z ρ−1 across intermediate goods).
The research good Output of the research good, which is the input used for innovative investment by firms, is given by
Here, A rt represents the stock of freely available scientific progress, which grows at an exogenous rateḡ A r . The term Z φ−1 t with φ ≤ 1 reflects intertemporal knowledge spillovers in the production of the research good.
Innovative Investment by Entering Firms
Entering firms purchase units of the research good to invest in obtaining the frontier technology to produce an intermediate good that is new to that entering firm. The resource requirement at t to enter and obtain a new product at t + 1 is ∆M −ψ t units of the research good. When ψ = 0, the investment of the research good required to invest in a new product is independent of the number of existing products. Let x et M t denote the measure of entering firms at t, where x et denotes the measure of entering firms relative to the measure of existing products at t. Total expenditure of the research good by entering firms is ∆x et M 1−ψ t . Each of these x et M t entering firms acquires with probability 1 − exp(−∆λ) a frontier technology to produce at the start of period t + 1 an intermediate good with some productivity index z .
Under these assumptions, the effective entry cost, ∆M −ψ t 1−exp (−∆λ) , is approximately unchanged with ∆ for small values of ∆.
With probability δ e , this productivity index z drawn by the entrant at t + 1 is associated with an intermediate good that was already being produced by an incumbent firm at t, but with a lower productivity index. Since identical intermediate goods are perfect substitutes in the production of the final consumption good, competition in the product market between the entering firm and the previous incumbent producer of this intermediate good implies that the previous incumbent producer ceases production of the good. In this case, the innovative investment by the entering firm does not result in a net increase in the total measure of products available M t+1 . Instead, it only results in a positive increment to the average productivity index across existing products. As is common in the literature, we say that this intermediate good that is new to the entering firm was stolen from an incumbent firm.
With the complementary probability 1 − δ e , this technology allows this entering firm to produce an intermediate good that is new to society as a whole in the sense that it has elasticity of substitution in demand with all other existing intermediate goods determined by ρ. In this case, the innovative investment by the entering firm results in a net increase in the total measure of products available M t+1 . The parameter δ e thus indexes the extent of business stealing by entering firms.
Stolen products in entering firms at t + 1 have a productivity index z drawn from a distribution such that the expected value of the random variable z raised to the power of (ρ − 1) is equal to Ez ρ−1 = η es Z ρ−1 t /M t , with η es > 1. The productivity index z for products that are new to society in entering firms is drawn in a manner similar to that in Luttmer (2007) . Specifically, we assume that new products in entering firms at t + 1 have a productivity index z drawn from a distribution such that Ez ρ−1 = η en Z ρ−1 t /M t , with η en > 0. These assumptions imply that the average value of z ρ−1 across all products produced by entering firms at t + 1 is given by Ez ρ−1 = η e Z ρ−1 t /M t , where η e ≡ δ e η es + (1 − δ e )η en .
The resource requirement at t to enter and obtain a new product (with probability 1 − exp(−∆λ)) at t + 1 is ∆M −ψ t units of the research good. Note that when ψ = 1, the resources required to create one new product fall with the number of existing products. When ψ = 0, the investment of the research good required to invest in a new product is independent of the number of existing products. The total expenditure by entering firms is ∆x et M 1−ψ t . Investments in new products by incumbent firms Incumbent firms have the opportunity to invest in acquiring new products to their firm and to improve their existing products. We assume that if an incumbent firm at t has the frontier technology to produce an intermediate good with index z, it also has the opportunity to invest ∆x mt (z) units of the research good to acquire an additional product (new to the firm) at t + 1 with probability
where s t (z) denotes the sime of the firm. Here, h(·) is a strictly increasing and concave function with h(0) = 0 and h(x) < 1 for all x.
As is the case with entry, acquisition of new products by incumbent firms may arise from business stealing from other incumbent firms or from the creation of products that are new to society. Consider the productivity index z for a newly acquired product that an incumbent firm obtains at t + 1 arising from innovative investment associated with a product with index z at t. With probability δ m , the product acquired by the incumbent firm at t + 1 is stolen from another incumbent firm and has productivity index z at t + 1 drawn at random from a distribution such that Ez ρ−1 = η ms z ρ−1 , with η ms > 1. With complementary probability 1 − δ m , the newly acquired product is new to society. We assume that the productivity index z in this case is drawn from a distribution such that Ez ρ−1 = η mn z ρ−1 , with η mn > 0. The average value of (z ) ρ−1 of the new products acquired by an incumbent firm investing based on a current product with frontier productivity z is Ez ρ−1 = η m z ρ−1 where we define
denote the total expenditure by incumbent firms on acquiring new products. Then aggregation gives
Investment in continuing products by incumbent firms
For each product that they produce at t, incumbent firms can lose its production capacity at t + 1 either due to exogenous exit (with probability (1 − exp (−∆δ 0 ))) or due to business stealing. For each product that they produce at t, incumbents have research capacity that allows them to invest to improve the index z of that product if they retain it at t + 1. Specifically, if an incumbent firm with a product with productivity z at t spends ∆x ct (z) of the research good on improving that product, it draws a new productivity index z , conditional on not losing that product to exogenous exit or business stealing, from a distribution such that
We assume that ζ(·) is a strictly increasing and concave function, with ζ(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0. In addition, we assume that η es > exp(∆ζ(x)) and η ms > exp(∆ζ(x)) for all x in equilibrium. These inequalities correspond to the requirement that a product that is stolen from incumbent firms is, in expectation, produced with a higher z at t + 1 in its new firm than it would have had as a continuing product in the firm that previously produced it. Equivalently, stolen products have larger average size than continuing products in incumbent firms. Note that these assumptions are satisfied if ∆ is small enough. We define the aggregate quantity of this type of innovative investment by incumbent firms as ∆x ct M 1−ψ t . Again, aggregation gives
With these definitions, we can write the resource constraint for the research good as
Dynamics of M and Z Under our assumptions, we show below that incumbent firms at every date t in equilibrium, choose investment according to
and
With these choices of innovative investment by incumbent firms proportional to product size s t (z), we have that the probability that each incumbent obtains a new product is constant across products at 1 − exp(−∆h(x mt )) and the expected rate of growth of z ρ−1 for incumbent products that do not exit is constant across products and given by exp(∆ζ(x ct )).
With this pattern of investment by incumbents, the evolution of the total measure of intermediate products M t is given by log M t+1 − log M t = H(x mt , x et ; ∆) where
and exp(−∆δ ct ) is the probability that a product remains in the same incumbent firm at t + 1, where
In the continuous time limit we have δ c (x mt , x et ) = δ 0 + δ m h(x mt ) + δ e λx et and 1
Likewise, the evolution of aggregate productivity is given by log Z t+1
In the continuous time limiṫ
In our derivations below, we make use of the share of production labor employed in new firms (that is, firms that just entered) as t + 1, which is given by
In the continuous time limit,
1 For any variable X t , we defineẊ t = lim ∆→0
Equilibrium
Here we describe the changes to the equilibrium equations that take into account the length of the time period, ∆. The discounted present value of after tax dividends of the physical capital stock holding company is
with dividends per unit of time of
Intermediate good firms dividends at time t per unit of time associated with a product with frontier technology z are given by
(18) which can be written as D t (s t (z)) = D t s t (z), where
Given this strategy for investment, each incumbent product remains in the same firm at t + 1 with probability exp(−∆δ ct ) and has expected size conditional on survival in the same firm equal to exp(∆ζ(
t+1 . In addition, this firm anticipates acquiring a new product with expected size of η m s t (z)Z ρ−1 t /Z ρ−1 t+1 with probability 1 − exp(−∆h(x mt )). Thus, under this investment strategy, the expected discounted present value of dividends associated with a product of size s t (z) at t inclusive of the dividend at t is directly proportional to the size of the product, i.e. it can be written as V t s t (z) where the factors of proportionality {V t } satisfy the recursion
where the interest rate R t is defined by exp(−∆R t ) ≡ Q t+1 /Q t . Now consider the first order conditions that govern the investment choices of an incumbent firm managing a product with frontier technology z at t conditional on following our assumed investment strategy in equations (9) and (10) from period t + 1 on. The current dividend that the firm earns is given as a function of its investment choices in equation (18). The expected value of the products at t + 1 that the firm expects to gain from these investments is given by
Taking the first order conditions trading off the impact of investment on dividends at t and expected value at t + 1 confirms that the optimal choice of innovative investment at t is of the form (9) and (10) where x mt and x ct satisfy
Finally, we consider the incentives of entering firms. As described above, an investment of ∆M −ψ t units of the research good at t yields a new product with probability of 1 − exp(−∆λ) and expected size η e Z ρ−1 t /M t Z ρ−1 t+1 . Thus, in equilibrium, we must have
where this expression is an equality if there is positive investment in entry in period t.
In any period t with positive entry, we can combine equations (21) and (23) to obtain a static equation determining x mt given by
This condition implies that x mt is constant in any periods in which entry is positive. Likewise, in any period t with positive entry, we can combine equations (22) and (23) to obtain a static equation relating x et , x mt and x ct given by
Since x mt is constant in all periods t in which entry is positive, equation (25) defines an implicit function x c (x et ) that determines x ct as a function of x et in every period in which entry is positive. Note that the derivative on this function is given by
Since ∂ ∂x e δ c (x m , x e ) approaches a constant as ∆ → 0 (see equation (12)), then dx c /dx e approaches zero as ∆ → 0 (even if there is business stealing). This result implies that as ∆ → 0, x ct is constant in all periods t with positive entry.
The intertemporal budget constraint for the household is given by
Government fiscal expenditures net of corporate tax receipts is
The government budget constraint is T t = E t for all t. The equilibrium is defined as in the body of the paper.
B Balanced Growth Path
We now describe how to solve for a balanced growth path (BGP) of this economy given policies and model parameters. On a BGP, policies rates are constant, and the exogenous sequences for A rt and L t grow at constant rates ∆ḡ A and ∆ḡ L . Output Y t , physical capital K t+1 , and consumption C t grow at a common rate ∆ḡ y . Aggregate productivity Z t+1 and the measure of products M t grow at rates ∆ḡ Z and ∆ḡ M . Innovative investment rates per product remain constant over time atx c ,x m , andx e . This last assumption implies from equation (8) 
B.1 BGP growth rates
We consider the variable
together with the physical capital stock K t as the endogenous state variables of the economy. By construction, we havē
Since the product Y rt M ψ−1 t is constant over time on a BGP, equations (7) and (8) imply that the growth rate of J on a BGP depends only on the sum the growth of scientific progress and population and not on policies:ḡ
The division of the growth of J into components due to growth in aggregate productivity Z and growth in the number of products M depends on the parameters φ and ψ and on policies as follows. The value ofx m on a BGP with positive entry is determined from equation (24) while the implicit functionx c (x e ) is determined from equation (25). The BGP level ofx e is then determined from the equation
Recall that as ∆ → 0,x c (x e ) approaches a constant. This implies that for small enough ∆, as long as η e > δ e ζ(∆x c ) and δ e ≤ 1, then the right hand side of this expression is strictly increasing inx e so at most one positive solution to this equation exists.
Once one solves for innovative investmentsx c ,x m ,andx e , the growth rates of aggregate productivity and the measure of products are given by
andḡ
B.2 BGP levels
We now describe how to solve for the equilibrium levels of variables on a BGP given levels of A rt and L rt . The level of
is determined on a BGP, but that the levels of Z t and M t individually on the BGP are not pinned down by BGP equations alone. As discussed below, these are determined by the initial conditions of the economy and the transition path to the new BGP. We use the following equations to solve for the level of variables on a BGP.
The consumer's intertemporal Euler equation gives
From equation (19), dividends from intermediate goods firms relative to output inclusive of production subsidies are given byd
From equation (20), the value of a product relative to output is given byv ≡ V t /Y t wherē
whereS e (∆) is given as a function of innovative investments and the growth rate of productivity from equation (76) below. The BGP value ofp r is then found as the solution to the BGP version of the free entry condition
The research intensity of the economy on a BGP is given by P rt Y rt / 1 + τ y Y t =p r (x c +x m +x e ) , and the allocation of labor to research is given bȳ
The ratio of physical capital to output is given by the standard Euler equation from the profit maximization problem of the physical capital holding company
Finally, from equations (7) and (8) together with the definition of J t , we get that the level of J t on a BGP is given byx
When ψ = 1, this equation is sufficient to pin down Z t . More generally, with ψ < 1, there is a continuum of pairs of Z t and M t each consistent with the same value of J t that are candidate values of aggregate productivity and the measure of products on a BGP. The particular values of Z t and M t that arise on a particular BGP depend upon the initial conditions of the economy Z 0 and M 0 and the transition path that the economy takes to converge to BGP. Specifically, an equilibrium sequence of innovative investments {x ct , x mt , x et } implies, through the functions H and G defined above in equations (11) and (14), a sequence of growth rates of the log of M t+1 and Z t+1 . This sequence of growth rates can then be used to trace out the paths for the levels of M t+1 and Z t+1 from their initial conditions to their levels on the BGP (should the equilibrium converge to a BGP). We use a first order approximation of these dynamics to solve for the levels of Z t and M t on a BGP as follows.
Consider a first order approximation to the dynamics of
, Z 0 , and M 0 to its BGP path {J t } taking as given a path for investment in entry {x et } that converges to its BGP levelx e . We use the fact the the initial and BGP values of J t are known to solve, up to a first order approximation, for the BGP values of Z t and M t . The results developed in the paper have the following counterparts with ∆ = 1.
The elasticity of the growth of aggregate productivity with respect to entry is defined as
Note that, given the expression for exp (−∆δ ct (x m , x c )) in equation (12), we have
The derivative
x c (x e ) is given in equation (26). Note that as ∆ → 0,
Similarly, define the elasticity of the growth in the number of products with respect to entry by
Note that as ∆ → 0,
By the definition of J we have
Thus we can define the elasticity Θ J of the growth rate of J with respect to changes in entry from
We then have Proposition 1 in the paper that allows us to pin down, up to a first order approximation, the BGP levels of aggregate productivity and the measure of products,Z 0 andM 0 , from initial conditions Z 0 and M 0 as follows:
where Θ G , Θ H and Θ J are evaluated at the BGP.
B.2.0.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To a first order approximation, we have
To be consistent with convergence to the BGP path, we must have that (log Z t+1 − logZ t+1 ) and (log M t+1 − logM t+1 ) converge to zero as (log J t+1 − logJ t+1 ) converges to zero. Setting the left hand side in equations (55) and (56) to zero, the unique values of the initial conditions (log Z 0 − logZ 0 ) and (log M 0 − logM 0 ) consistent with this terminal condition are given by equations (49) and (50). With these solutions for the BGP levels of aggregate productivity and the measure of products, it is straightforward to solve for the BGP level of the physical capital stock given the BGP allocation of labor to current production obtained from equation (38) and the BGP physical capital to output ratio obtained from equation (39).
C Characterizing dynamics of J, Z, and M
We now consider the dynamics of aggregate productivity implied by our model when the path of research labor {l rt L t } is taken as exogenous such that the fraction of labor allocated to research converges to its BGP valuel r and population, L t converges to its BGP path {L rt }. We assume that the ratios
(1−τcorpλI)(1−τm) (1−τcorpλE)(1−τe) and
Equations (7), (8), (11), (14), (24), (25), and (47) can be used to solve for the path Z t = {Y rt , x et , x mt , x ct , J t+1 , Z t+1 , M t+1 } given initial conditions for J 0 , Z 0 , M 0 and the path of research labor {l rt L t }. As discussed above, equation (24) implies that with positive entry, x mt = x m . Thus, equations (7), (8), and (25) imply that, to a first order approximation
where 
From equation (51), we have
Note that the initial condition of this AR1, log J 0 − logJ 0 , is given. Equation 39 in Proposition 2 when the length of time period is ∆ is given by
Once we solve for the dynamics of J, the dynamics of aggregate productivity Z and the measure of products are given by
Equations (62) and (63) are implied by equations (55) and (56) together with the initial condition from Proposition 1, (
(log J 0 − logJ 0 ). Note that the dynamics of aggregate productivity to the BGP, as given by log Z t − logZ t , does not depend on the initial decompositon of J 0 into Z 0 and M 0 .
We now provide a proof of Corollary 1: The statement of the Corollary is as follows. Suppose the economy starts at t = 0 on some initial BGP, and there is a change in the economic environment that leaves the growth rates {g At } and {g Lt } unchanged, and the allocation of researchx c ,x m , andx e unchanged across BGPs. Then, to a first order approximation, the dynamics of aggregate productivity relative to its initial BGP path are given by
The proof is as follows. Under the assumptions that the growth rates of scientific knowledge and population are unchanged, we have that the terms log L t−j − logL t = 0 in equation (61). Likewise, we have that the path of {A rt } is unchanged. Note that since we assume that the economy starts on an initial BGP, the terms l r0 , J 0 , and Z 0 correspond to the levels of these variables at t = 0 on that initial BGP. The termsl r ,J 0 , andZ 0 correspond to the values of these variables on the new BGP. The termḡ Z corresponds to the growth rate of aggregate productivity on the new BGP. Under the assumption that the allocation of innovative investmentx c ,x m , and x e is unchanged, we have that the growth rate of productivity on the new BGP is equal to its growth rate on the initial BGP. In addition, under the assumption that the allocation of investment is unchanged, we havex c +x m +x e =Ȳ r = Y r0 , and hence from equation (40), we have that log J 0 − logJ 0 = log l r0 = logl r . Using these equations and equations (59) and (62), we can then rewrite equation (61) as
Using the fact that logZ t+1 − logZ 0 = (t + 1)ḡ Z , and that the growth rate of aggregate productivity on the initial and the new BGP is the same, this gives us equation (64). This proves the result. When solving for the allocation of labor to production and research on the optimal BGP assume that the production subsidy τ y is set as required to undo the distortions of corporate taxes and markups on the accumulation of physical capital in equation (39). That is, we assume that τ y is set so that, on the BGP
The log of the consumption equivalent variation in welfare that arises from a perturbation of the BGP allocation is given, to a first order approximation by,
The allocation of labor to production and research on the optimal BGP is given bȳ
In the continuous time limit we havē
Note that the impact elasticity Θ G /A(∆) in this expression for the allocation of labor on the optimal BGP does not depend on the specification of the technology for research. As shown in equations (44) and (46), since dx c /dx e approaches zero as ∆ → 0, in the continuous time limit, this impact elasticity depends only on data on firm dynamics and the BGP ratio of innovative investment by entrants to total innovative investment. The specification of the research technology impacts our model's implications for the allocation of labor to research on the optimal BGP through its impact on the parameter Θ defined in equation (59) governing the persistence of the response of aggregate productivity to a perturbation to the allocation of labor to research.
D System of linearized equations
To solve for transitions of the model economy from its initial conditions to a new BGP, we loglinearize the equations of the model around the new BGP. We treat the variables J t and K t as the endogenous state variables of the model. When we consider demographic changes, we consider exogenously specified paths for the growth rate of populations denoted by g Lt = log L t+1 − log L t . We assume that the sequence {g Lt } converges to a new BGP growth rateḡ L . The log-linearized versions of the model equations are as follows. The log-linearized versions of equation (1) is given by
where a tilde over a variable indicates the difference between the log of a variable and the log of its level on the BGP. Equation (5) becomes
The resource constraint on labor is 0 =l rl rt +l plpt
As discussed above, equations (7), (8), (11), (14), (24), (25), and (47) give us equation (60) 
The first order condition for consumption is the standard equation
The Euler equation for physical capital is the standard equation
Finally, we derive the Euler equation governing investment in entry by log-linearizing equations (20) and (23). We let
The equations to be log-linearized include
which is derived from the first order condition of the profit maximization problem of the firm producing the research good and the formula for the fraction of output of the final consumption good paid as wages, as well as
which is derived from equation (19), the equation
which is derived from equation (20), (14), and (16), and the zero profits at entry condition dervided from (23)
We use the zero profits at entry condition as the second intertemporal Euler equation in the model. We use this condition to substitute into the equation for the value function to get
The log-linearized versions of these equations arẽ
E Calibration
Our calibration strategy is similar, but not identical, to that in Atkeson and Burstein (2018) (henceforth AB2018). We impose the following restrictions on policies in the initial BGP. Incumbent firms can deduct all of their innovative investments (λ i = 1), while entering firms cannot (λ e = 0) since they are not incorporated at the time of their investments. We follow Barro and Furman (2018) in setting the corporate profit tax rates, τ corp = 0.38 (and, in the corporate profits tax experiment, we set the new tax rate to τ corp = 0.26). 2 We set the extent of physical investment expensing λ k as discussed below. We set τ c = τ m = τ e = τ rd = 0.03 as in AB2018. We allow for a production subsidy τ y to remove the distortions in the allocation of physical capital induced by the markup and the corporate profits tax. The choice of τ y only affects our welfare calculations. We set the time period to one month, ∆ = 1/12, and λ = 1 (without loss of generality for our model's loglinearized dynamics, as long as λ > 0). We consider three combinations of the spillover parameters φ and ψ: {0.96, 1}, {−1.6, 1} and {0.96, 0}. We set ρ = 4 and γ = 1 as in AB2018. We setḡ L = 0.007 andḡ M = 0.01 as in AB2018, and chooseḡ A so thatḡ Y = 0.025 as in AB2018, whereḡ
We set β to satisfy (by equation (33))
We use the measures in AB2018 of the annual growth of the measure of products g A Mt = log(M t+1 /M t ), the fraction of products that are continuing products in incumbent firms f A ct+1 , the fraction of products that are new to incumbent firms measured as the sum of those that are new to society and stolen f A mt+1 , and the fraction of products that are produced in entering firms measured as the sum of those that are new to society and stolen f A et+1 = 1 − f A ct+1 − f A mt+1 , the aggregate size of continuing products in incumbent firms s A ct+1 , the aggregate size of products that are new to incumbent firms measured as the sum of those that are new products and those that are stolen s A mt+1 , and the aggregate size of products that are new to entering firms measured as the sum of those that are new products and those that are stolen s A et+1 = 1 − s A ct+1 − s A mt+1 . Time averages of these variables are denoted with a bar. In section E we show how to convert these annual measures to per unit of time measuresf i (∆) ands i (∆) for i = e, m, c. For simplicitly, in what follows we omit the argument (∆), sof i =f i (∆) ands i =s i (∆).
We calibrate δ 0 , η e , η m and the initial BGP values ofδ c , h(x m ), ζ(x c ),x e to satisfy the following equations:f
In the specification without business stealing, we set δ m = δ e = 0. In the specification with business stealing we set δ m = δ e so that, as in AB2018,
We calibrate ζ (x c ) and h (x m ) using equations (24) and (25):
We specify the functions h(·) and ζ(·) as
In order to calibrate the parameters h 1 , h 2 , ζ 1 , and ζ 2 , we must know the values ofx c andx m . Our calibration procedure uses as an input a measure of (x c +x m ) /Ȳ r and implies a value ofx e /Ȳ r , but does not pin downx c andx m separately. To determine the value ofx c , we follow the same logic as in AB2018. The contribution of investment in acquiring products each period to firm value must be nonnegative. That is, on a BGP, we must havev at least as large as the value that the firm would obtain if it were to set investment into acquiring new products equal to zero in every period. Given the assumption that h(0) = 0, this alternative valueṽ of incumbent firms on a BGP is given bỹ
and the value of the firmv is given bȳ
The requirement thatṽ ≤v implies that the research expenditures of incumbents on improving continuing products relative to value added must lie between the bounds
In our calibration, we setp rxc in the middle point between the two bounds. Given values ofx m , h (x m ), and h (x m ), we determine the values of h 0 and h 1 . Given values ofx c , ζ (x c ), and ζ (x c ) (which are assigned as described above, independently of ζ 2 ) and a value of 0 < ζ 2 < 1, we determine the values of ζ 0 and ζ 1 . We set ζ 2 halfway between its two bounds, that is, ζ 2 = 0.5. We now describe how how we set {α, δ k , µ, λ k }. We set δ k such that exp(−δ K ) = 1 − 0.055 as in AB2018. We choose µ so that Tobin's q is equal to 1.15, where Tobin's q is defined as
given the expressions for values and dividends above,
and where we setK Y(1+τ y ) = 2.12 andp r (x c +x m ) = 0.061 as in AB2018. We solve for α using
(1+τy)Ȳt = 0.654 (as in AB2018) and for λ K using
In some exercises we set τ y in order to remove the distortion on the Euler equation for physical capital as given in equation (65). We calculate unmeasured investment by entrantsp rxe as
total innovative investment asī r =p r (x c +x m +x e ) and the ratio of production to research labor as
Firm dynamics at an annual frequency on a BGP
Given a choice of ∆, we calibrate our model to statistics on firm dynamics at an annual frequency. Let ∆ = 1/N for some integer N. Thus, if M t is the measure of products at the beginning of the year, then M t+N is the measure of products at the beginning of the next year. On a BGP, we assume that all per period growth rates, entry rates, and exit rates are constant. We now describe the method we use to match parameters governing per period rates to data at an annual frequency.
Let exp(−δ c )M t denote the measure of products produced at t + N that were produced by the same incumbent firm at t. Let F c denote the ratio of this measure to M t+N or, equivalently, the fraction of products at t + N that are incumbent products (from period t) in incumbent firms. This fraction satisfies
Then we can interpret exp(−δ c ) as the probability at an annual frequency that any product at tcontinues in the same firm until t + N. The corresponding per period survival rate is exp(−∆δ c ).
We assume that this per period survival rate is constant across all incumbent products. Let F m M t+N denote the measure of products produced at t + N that are produced in incumbent firms (firms that existed at t) but that are new to that firm. Then (F m + F c ) M t+N is the measure of products at t + N that are produced in incumbent firms (firms that existed at t). Let (1 − exp(−∆h(x m )) denote the probability each period that incumbent firms add new products per product that they currently produce. Let M I t+j denote the measure of products at t + j produced in firms that existed at time t. These firms will add (1 − exp(−∆h(x m ))M I t+j products in period t + j + 1 and lose (1 − exp(−∆δ c ))M I t+j products so that
Note that M I t+j = M t for j = 0 and M I t+N = (F m + F c ) M t+N or j = N . Thus, the total measure of products produced at t + N in firms that existed at t is given by
Hence, the total measure of products produced at t + N in firms that existed at tthat are new to those firms is
We have the fraction of products at t + N that are produced in firms that did not exist at t is then given by
Note that these equations imply that if we define F c (∆) to be the fraction of products at t + 1 that were produced in the same firm at t and t + 1, we have
and if we define F c (∆) + F m (∆) to be the fraction of products at t + 1 that are produced in a firm that operated at t and t + 1, we have
Finally, we have that the fraction of products at t + 1 produced in firms the did not exist at tis given by
where this last equation follows from equations (11) and (12).
We proceed in a parallel fashion to convert annual employment shares S c ,S m ,and S e to per period shares S c (∆), S m (∆), S e (∆).
Let S c denote the fraction of employment at t + N in firms producing products that they also produced at t. As shown above, there are exp(−δ c )M t of these products. These products had an average value of z ρ−1 of Z ρ−1 t /M t . The average value of z ρ−1 for these products grew at rate exp(∆ζ(x c )) for N periods, so these products end up with an average value of of z ρ−1 equal to exp(ζ(x c ))Z ρ−1 t /M t . Thus, we have
Let S c + S m denote the fraction of employment at t + N in firms that were also active at t. By definition, S m is the share of employment in these firms at t + N producing products that they did not produce at t. Parallel arguments to those above give
Finally, we have
where this last equation follows from equation (14).
F Quantitative results
In this appendix, we report the responses of aggregate productivity and output, welfare, the allocation of labor in research, the share of production and incumbents' research labor compensation in output (i.e.
(1 − α)/µ + p r (x c + x m )), the share in employment of entrants (i.e. S e ), the valuation of firms as measured by Tobin's Q defined in equation (68), and the elasticities (Θ G , Θ H , Θ J , and Θ G /A) for the experiments that we consider in section 5 of the paper. We first consider a uniform subsidy to innovation. We next consider an exogenous change in the markup. We next consider a change in the corporate profits tax.
F.1 Uniform increase in innovation subsidies
We consider a uniform increase in innovation subsidies to implement an increase in the innovation intensity of the economy from 0.090 on the initial BGP to 0.102 on the new BGP. The corresponding allocation of labor to research rises froml r /l p = 0.139 on the initial BGP to a value of 0.155 on the new BGP. We show results from this experiment in Tables 1 -8 . The responses of aggregate productivity at 20 and 100 years along the equilibrium transition path shown in Table 2 are similar to those shown in our experiment above in Table 1 in the paper. The responses of aggregate output shown in Table 3 are smaller than the corresponding responses of aggregate productivity because the amount of labor allocated to current production is permanently reduced. As shown in Table  4 , this innovation policy experiment has very little impact on the valuation of firms as measured by Tobin's Q, except for the case of the First Generation Endogenous Growth research technology. In this case, the valuation of firms drops considerably. This is because the share of employment in entering firms rises for a very long time along the transition in the case with the First Generation Endogenous Growth research technology as shown in Table 6 . This persistent increase in entry leads to a decline in the ratio of product value V t to dividends D t along the transition. As shown in Table 5 , the share of labor compensation (including both production and research labor by incumbents) in output rises slightly due to the increase in the incumbents' innovation intensity of the economy. As shown in Table 1 , this uniform increase in innovation subsidies leads to a significant increase in welfare in the specification of the model with the First Generation Endogenous Growth research technology, a more moderate increase in welfare in with the JKS research technology, and a decline in welfare with the Second Generation Endogenous Growth research technology. The values in each column are in log deviations relative to the initial trend. The values in each column are in log deviations relative to the initial trend. The values in each column are in levels. The initial BGP level is equal to 1.15. The calculation of the employment share of entrants corresponds to the annual share at the beginning of the 20th year after the policy shock. The values in each column are in levels. The initial BGP level is 0.027. 
F.2 Increase in markup µ
We calibrate the increase in markups µ so that the change in the allocation of labor to research from the initial to the new BGP is the same as that we considered with the uniform innovation subsidies. In this experiment, we set to zero the production subsidy, τ y . We report the results in Tables 9 -16 . A permanent increase in the markup µ has qualitatively the same effects as a uniform increase in innovation subsidies. Again, if we hold all other parameters and policies fixed, we find that the new BGP has the same allocation of innovative investmentx c ,x m , andx e and hence the same growth rates of aggregate productivity and the measure of products. As was the case with a uniform change in innovation subsidies, however, on the new BGP, the economy has a higher innovation intensity of the economy measured as the ratio of expenditures on innovative investment relative to output as a result of the increase in markups. In particular, this change moves the innovation intensity of the economy from 0.090 on the initial BGP to 0.100 on the new BGP.
By comparing Table 7 and Table 15 , we can see that the change in the allocation of labor to research at the 20 year and 100 year horizons is also very similar across experiments. From Table  2 and Table 10 , these similar perturbations to the allocation of labor to research produce similar responses of the level of aggregate productivity relative to trend at horizons of 20 and 100 years. However, because markups are higher in this case, as indicated in Tables 3 and 11 , the response of aggregate output at the 20 and 100 year horizons is smaller. The increase in markups discourages the accumulation of physical capital. In Table 12 , we see that Tobin's Q is higher in this experiment than what we found with uniform innovation subsidies. The increase in markups has a very similar impact on the share of labor compensation in output as a uniform increase in innovation subsidies. The impact of this experiment on firm dynamics as measured by the share of employment in entrants is also very similar to that found with a uniform change in innovation subsidies. The impact of this change in markups on welfare is only very slightly smaller than that found with uniform innovation subsidies. The values in each column are in log deviations relative to the initial trend. The values in each column are in levels. The initial BGP level is is 1.15. The calculation of the employment share of entrants corresponds to the annual share at the beginning of the 20th year after the policy shock. The values in each column are in levels. The initial BGP level is 0.027. 
F.3 Reduction in corporate profits tax rate
We follow Barro and Furman (2018) (henceforth BF2018) in changing the corporate profit tax rate from τ corp = 0.38 to τ corp = 0.26. We choose the new value λ k = 1.05 to match the change in the user cost of capital across BGPs implied by the BF2018 calibration (so that the increase in the log of the output/capital ratio across BGPs is equal to 0.08). We set to zero the production subsidy, τ y . In addition to the values for the three specifications for the research technology, we show results in a specification of the model in which innovative investments by entering and incumbent firms are fixed exogenously at their initial BGP levels, so that aggregate productivity grows exogenously is in BF2018. We also consider a specification of our model in which innovation by incumbent firms is fixed at the initial BGP levels, and only innovation by entrants responds to the policy change. We report the results in Tables 17 -25 . Consider first the results from our version of a standard model with exogenous productivity. By construction, the response of aggregate productivity reported in the first row of Table 17 is zero at all horizons. In the first row of Table 18 , we find that output per worker rises by 2.4% in a horizon of 20 years relative to the path for output per worker that would have occurred without the policy change and 2.5% in a horizon of 100 years. So the response of aggregate output is relatively modest and the convergence to the new BGP is fast. The welfare impact of the change in corporate profits taxes in this version of our model is reported in the first row of Table 20 . Here, the consumption equivalent change in welfare is 0.4%.
In the specification of the model where firms change their innovation policies after the reduction in the corporate profits' tax, the allocation of labor to research rises froml r /l p = 0.139 on the initial BGP to a value of approximately 0.144 across all specifications. In addition, innovation investments by incumbents fall in the new BGP. In the first two specifications of the research technology, whether or not reallocation of investment towards entry is desirable depends on the extent of business stealing and the extent to which the initial corporate profits tax policies had favored investment by incumbent firms over investment by entering firms on the initial BGP. The change in aggregate productivity over a 20 and 100 year horizon can be either positive (without business stealing) or negative (with business stealing). In the 20 year horizon, the change in aggregate productivity relative to trend is between +3.5% and 5.3% without business stealing and roughly −2% with business stealing. The change in output per worker over a 20 year is between +6.3% and 7.7% without business stealing and roughly −0.5% with business stealing. The implications for productivity and output over a 100 year horizon and for long-term welfare are very large in absolute terms (positive without business stealing and negative without business stealing), specially under the first research technology.
For the third specification of the research technology (Second Generation Endogenous Growth), the reallocation towards innovation by entrants implies a reduction in the BGP growth rate of productivity, with very negative implications for aggregate productivity, output and welfare (with or without business stealing). ** Here we could discuss the planning problem and that the social planner wants to turn off entry in the third specification Another way of understanding the role of reallocation of innovation from incumbents to entrants is to compare the implications of the baseline model the alternative specification in which innovative investments by incumbents are exogenously fixed at their initial BGP level (see Tables  26 -25 ). We can see in Table 26 that aggregate productivity rises in all cases, in contrast to the baseline model in which investments by incumbents respond to the policy change. The impact elasticity on aggregate productivity in this case is identical to that in our uniform subsidy experiment. The change in aggregate productivity is slightly smaller than under the uniform innovation subsidy experiment reported in Tables 2 due to a smaller extent of labor reallocation from production to research.
As shown in Table 19 , this experiment implies a large increase in the valuation of firms (as measured by Tobins Q) in all cases except for the First Generation Endogenous Growth research technology. The increase in valuation occurs because the market share of incumbents is relatively stable so the value of the firm scales almost one to one with the after tax value of profits, which rise with the reduction in the corporate profits tax. In contrast, in the First Generation Endogenous Growth research technology the valuation of firms drops considerably because the share of employment in entering firms rises for a very long time.
As shown in Table 21 , despite the overall increase in the research intensity induced by the change in corporate profit taxation, the share of labor compensation (including both production and incumbents' research labor) in output drops slightly. This is due to the fact that the research share is reallocated to entrants, and the wage bill of entering firms is not measured in aggregate output. The values in each column are in log deviations relative to the initial trend. In the 2nd Generation EG models, the growth rate of TFP gZ falls from 0.0136 to 0.0102 and of products M increases from 0.0100 to 0.0101. The values in each column are in log deviations relative to the initial trend. In the 2nd Generation EG models, the growth rate g Y/L falls from 0.0181 to 0.0136. The calculation of the employment share of entrants corresponds to the annual share at the beginning of the 20th year after the policy shock. The initial BGP level is 0.027. The values in each column are in log deviations relative to the initial trend. In the 2nd Generation EG models, the growth rates g Z and g M are unchanged between BGPs. The values in each column are in log deviations relative to the initial trend. In the 2nd Generation EG models, the growth rate g Y is unchanged between BGPs. The values in each column are in levels. The initial BGP level is 0.139.
F.4 Population growth decline
We consider a gradual and permanent reduction in the population growth rate g Lt . In particular, the growth rate of the population falls by half a percentage point (broadly consistent with the projections by the CBO summarized in Shackleton et al. (2018) ) from the old BGP rate of 0.7% to 0.2% with an AR1 coefficient of 0.93 on an annual basis. This implies the the half life of the transition of the population is roughly ten years. We report the results in Tables 29 -36 . Changes in the BGP growth rates, reported in Table 29 , are calculated using the two sufficient statistics discussed in the text. Given the large response of the growth rate in the First Generation Endogenous Growth research technology, we do not present results in this case.
The reallocation of labor away from research implies that aggregate productivity falls relative to the initial BGP trend. As shown in Table 30 , the magnitude of the reduction in the first 20 years is quite modest. Output per capita falls by less than productivity (or rises slightly) due to the reallocation of labor towards production. As shown in Tables 32 and 33 , the decline in the population growth rates has a very small impact on the valuation of firms as measured by Tobin's Q. The share of labor compensation in output in a 20 year horizon falls slightly due to the increase in the innovation intensity of the economy. The values in each column are in levels. The BGP value, corresponding to a growth rate in population of 0.0067., is 1.15. The calculation of the employment share of entrants corresponds to the annual share at the beginning of the 20th year after the policy shock. The values in each column are in levels. The BGP value, corresponding to a growth rate in population of 0.0067, is 0.027. 
